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IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: CALIFORNIA COURTS
RESPOND TO NO-FAULT DISSOLUTIONS
The recent California Family Law Act1 (hereinafter the Act or
FLA) represents a concerted legislative effort to eliminate the fault,
or "marital guilt," notion from proceedings for dissolution of mar-
riage.2 Radical changes in both the grounds to be proven and the
procedures to be followed have been made.8  This Comment will
describe the extent of change from prior law and -will trace the conse-
quences, and the problems, which have developed.
At first glance, the FLA appears to have eliminated virtually every
barrier which a petitioning party previously had to overcome. In
fact, various authorities believe that the FLA provides for virtually
"carte blanche" dissolutions in that anyone seeking a dissolution of
his or her marriage can obtain one merely by observing certain legal
formalities.4 Yet, more than four years after its passage, the nature,
quantum, and source of proof which must be adduced to obtain a dis-
solution under the Act have been, at best, only partially delineated.'
That the new ground for dissolution is itself defined with sufficient
clarity to satisfy the requirements of constitutional due process has
been tentatively affirmed,' but whether or not actual trial court prac-
tice satisfies the procedural requirements of due process has not even
been raised at the appellate level, let alone answered.7 The actual re-
quirements of the FLA remain an enigma in California law.
I. THm PRIOR "FAULT" SYSTEM OF DIvoRcE
In order to appreciate the extent of the changes worked by the
Act, and especially to understand the "carte blanche" view taken by
some, prior California divorce law must first be examined.
1. CAL. CMy. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1970).
2. CAL. ASSEMBLY CoMMrrrEB ON JuDIciAY, REPORT OF 1969 DIVORCE REFORm
LEGIsL.ATION, 4 CAL. ASSEM. J. 8054, 8057 (Aug. 8, 1969) [hereinafter cited as
ASSEMBLY REPORT]. See Comment, The End of Innocence: Elimination of Fault in
California Divorce Law, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1306 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Innocence]. See text accompanying notes 47-115 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 47-115 infra.
4. See Innocence, supra note 2, at 1306 n.3.
5. See text accompanying notes 134-204 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 208-66 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 267-78 infra.
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Former Civil Code section 928 required the party seeking divorce
to establish the other spouse's "fault." Only by proof of one or more
of seven specified grounds was the court empowered to judicially termi-
nate the marriage.9 The grounds consisted of adultery, extreme cru-
elty, conviction of felony, willful desertion, willful neglect, habitual in-
temperance, and incurable insanity. 10 The first three of the causes
required only a single act by the "guilty" spouse.' The others re-
quired continuance of a condition for a period of one year,' 2 with
the exception of incurable insanity for which three years was -the req-
uisite duration. 18 Since it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove
the defendant's fault, divorce proceedings were adversary in nature,
and "questionable methods of gathering effective but lurid and ludi-
crous evidence were occasionally employed.'
14
More than ninety percent of all divorce complaints filed under
the fault system were based upon extreme cruelty1 5 Usually easy
to prove, this ground could be established by the plaintiff's uncon-
tested testimony that the defendant was "cold -and indifferent," thus
causing the plaintiff to become "nervous and upset."'" A single
witness (required by statute'1 ) corroboirated this testimony, "and
the legal charade was complete.""' Most proceedings were by de-
fault, and the requisite ground was often the product of an agreement
between the spouses.19
8. Enacted 1872; amended, ch. 612, § 32, [1873-74] Cal. Stat. 191 (repealed, ch. 1608,
§ 3, [1969] Cal. Stat. 3313).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 152 Cal. 316, 92 P. 853 (1907); Woodworth
v. Woodworth, 242 Cal. App. 2d 301, 51 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1966); Wirz v. Wirz, 96 Cal.
App. 2d 171, 214 P.2d 839 (1950); Lucich v. Lucich, 75 Cal. App. 2d 890, 172 P.2d
73 (1946).
12. CAL. CIv. CODE § 107 (enacted 1872; repealed, ch. 1608, § 3, [1969] Cal. Stat.
3313).
13. CAL. CIv. CODE § 108 (ch. 951, § 2, [1941] Cal. Stat. 2547; amended, ch. 1580,
§ 1, [1951] Cal. Stat. 3578; repealed, ch. 1608, § 3, [1969] Cal. Stat. 3313).
14. AssmSmLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8057.
15. Goddard, A Report on California's New Divorce Law: Progress and Problems,
6 FAMILY L.Q. 405, 406 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Goddard]; CAL. DEP'T OF PUB.
HEALTH, BuREAu OF VrrAL STATISTICS, DIVoRcE IN CALIFOIU 175 (1967).
16. Goddard, supra note 15, at 406; CALIFORNIA GOViNoR's COMMISSION ON THE
FAMILY, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY 119 (1966).
17. CAL. Civ. CODE § 130 (enacted 1872; amended, ch. 612, § 32, [1873-74] Cal.
Stat. 191; repealed, ch. 1608, § 3, [1969] Cal. Stat. 3313).
18. See AssEmLy REPORT, supra note 2, at 8059, where this requirement is said
to be "one of the most demeaning features of the old law."
19. Id. at 8057.
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In a contested case, more conclusive evidence of misconduct was
required by the court, and the proceedings tended to become pro-
tracted.20 The necessity that the defendant be conclusively proven
at "fault" for having caused the breakdown of the marriage aggra-
vated the already bitter and antagonistic feelings between the par-
ties, often leaving traumatic effects on all involved, especially chil-
dren." "[The whole statutory scheme .. .promoted hate, scorn,
bitterness, and acrimony.12 2  Yet, the defendant's opposition did
not markedly reduce the plaintiff's chances of success. The only re-
sult of an attempt to prevent divorce was to make reconciliation less
possible. 3
11. THE TREND TOWARD "No-FAULT"
Critics of the marital guilt system felt that the fault concept was un-
related to the real cause(s) of marital failure. The commission of a
single act (e.g., cruelty or adultery) or the one-year continuance of a con-
dition (e.g., intemperance or desertion) would not necessarily cause the
total breakdown of a marriage. 24  Yet, proof of any of the seven
grounds, and only those seven, established marital breakdown as a
matter of law. Under the prior law, no situation of domestic incom-
patibility, no matter how intolerable to either or both spouses, would
justify divorce unless the facts of the situation could somehow sup-
port a statutory ground. 26 On the other hand, although the facts
alleged and proven constituted a proper ground for divorce (e.g., one
act of adultery), they might not have caused the alleged (or any) break-
down of the marriage. 26  In fact, the actual effect of the commission
of one of the specified acts on the spouse(s) and on the marriage itself
was immaterial. Even the state's vital interest in the marriage relation
did not invest the trial court with any special power to deny divorce
when the marriage had not in fact broken down so long as a statutory
ground was established by the evidence.
As early as 1952, Chief Justice Traynor's opinion in De Burgh
v. De Burgh28 recognized that, in the judicial decision to grant or to
20. Goddard, supra note 15, at 407.
21. ASSEMiBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8057.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Goddard, supra note 15, at 407.
25. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8056.
26. Goddard, supra note 15, at 407.
27. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8058.
28. 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
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deny divorce, primary, if not sole, consideration should be given to
the true condition of the marriage relationship and not to an estab-
lished set of statutory causes of marital breakdown.20 Writing for
the California Supreme Court, Chief Justice Traynor stressed the point
that "a marriage in name only is not a marriage in any real sense""°
and should be dissolved:
The court should determine whether the legitimate objects of matri-
mony have been destroyed or whether there is a reasonable likelihood
that the marriage can be saved.31
Since the family is the core of our society, the law seeks to foster
and preserve marriage. But when a marriage has failed and the family
has ceased to be a unit, the purposes of family life are no longer served
and divorce will be permitted.3
2
The court recognized the needlessness of making every divorce
action a demeaning and sordid chronicle of human failings. Thus
it urged "recognition of marriage failure as a social problem and
correspondingly less preoccupation with technical marital fault."88 It
is clear that the court, through Chief Justice Traynor, was indicating
that California should re-evaluate its divorce system and establish new
grounds and procedures to deal realistically with the true causes of
marital breakdown.
Chief Justice Traynor's call to re-evaluate the California divorce
system was not answered until 1966. Concerned with the "high inci-
dence of divorces in our society and its often tragic consequences,","
California Governor Edmund G. Brown established the Governor's
29. Mrs. De Burgh filed for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty, and her hus-
band cross-complained on the same ground. The trial court found both parties guilty
of cruelty and denied each a divorce under the former Civil Code section 122 ground of
recrimination. See note 89 infra. On appeal, Justice Traynor, writing for the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, reversed the trial court's decision by abrogating the prior judicial
rule of mechanical operation of the recrimination defense. De Burgh's substitution of
a broad discretion in the trial court to consider the important interests involved abol-
ished the defense of recrimination for all practical purposes and allowed parties who
were both "guilty" of cruelty to obtain a divorce. See Comment, Retreat from Recrim-
ination-De Burgh v. De Burgh, 41 CAIF. L. REV. 320 (1953); Note, Divorce: Re-
crimination-Is it Still a Defense in California?, 4 HASTINGS L.J 197 (1953); Com-
ment, California Recrimination Rule Reappraised, 5 STN. L. RV. 540 (1953).
30. 39 Cal. 2d at 868, 250 P.2d at 603.
31. Id. at 872, 250 P.2d at 606.
32. Id. at 864, 250 P.2d at 601.
33. Id. at 867, 250 P.2d at 603.
34. CALIFoRNrA GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY, REPORT Or TnE GoveR-
NOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY 1 (1966).
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Commission on the Family 5 (hereinafter the Governor's Commis-
sion).
The Governor's Commission adopted the De Burgh rationale that
dissolutions should be permitted "only upon a finding" that the mar-
riage had failed ,beyond redemption3 6 and recommended extensive re-
vision of the state's divorce laws, including the complete elimination of
the unrealistic fault grounds.3 7  By its proposed discarding of fault,
the Governor's Commission sought to eliminate the acrimony caused
by procedures which required the petitioning party to specifically plead
and prove a statutory ground,38 but its primary motive was to deal with
the real reasons of marital breakdown through
[new] procedures for the handling of marital breakdown which will per-
mit the [proposed] Family Court to make a full and proper inquiry
into the real problems of the family-procedures which will enable the
Court to focus its resources upon the actual difficulties confronting the
parties.3 9
The proposed family court procedure was to begin with the filing.
of a neutral "petition of inquiry'' 40 requesting the court to inquire
into the continuation of the marriage. 41  An initial evaluative in-
terview with the court's professional staff was to be held in each case
to determine the susceptibility of the spouses to conciliation or to as-
sist the spouses in resolving disputed issues when conciliation was not
workable and severance of the marriage was necessary.42  Raw
data concerning the causes of marriage failure were also to be com-
piled.43 Attendance of the parties at the interview was to be manda-
tory, a condition precedent to any further proceedings.44 Following
the interview(s), the staff would prepare a report on -the condition
of the marriage upon which the court would either order further
counseling for a period not to exceed sixty days or proceed with disso-
lution. 45 If, -at the end of the sixty day period, a reconciliation had
not been effected, the court was mandated to enter a decree dissolving
35. Id.
36. Id. at 28.
37. Id. at 1, 28.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id. at 17.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 22.
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the marriage upon the application of either party.46
When the FLA came before the California Legislature,47 the As-
sembly Committee on the Judiciary (hereinafter the Assembly Com-
mittee) responded -to the recommendations made by the Governor's
Commission in the Report of 1969 Divorce Reform Legislation.
48
The Assembly Committee similarly accepted the De Burgh language
that a dissolution should be based solely upon a judicial finding that
"the legitimate objects of matrimony [had] been destroyed and [that]
there [was] no reasonable likelihood that the marriage [could] be
saved." 49  However, in a multi-faceted broadside attack, the Assem-
bly Committee summarily rejected the Governor's Commission's pro-
posals.5"
Counseling was believed to be effective only if both spouses were
willing to participate.51 Additionally, to "inject the powers of the state
into matters of private concern '5 was characterized as an unconscion-
able invasion of marital privacy. 3 The rejection of the proposal for
mandatory counseling 54 was also influenced by pragmatic considera-
tions. The estimated cost was in excess of $10 million per year, "a
heavy price to pay when no evidence [had] established that counseling
would have any significant effect upon family stability."'55 Finally, the
Assembly Committee determined that the proposed system, under
which the court was required to accept the counselor's recommenda-
tions,5"
would have terminated the court's power to deny a decree of dissolution
.. . [and that] the court would be performing a ministerial func-
'tion which could be accomplished just as well by a referee.6
7
To implement a dissolution procedure without mandatory counsel-
ing while still adhering to the De Burgh rationale the Assembly Com-
mittee retained the established conciliation court system58 and the re-
46. Id. at 23.
47. Cal. A.B. 530, Reg. Sess. (1969); Cal. S.B. 252, Reg. Sess. (1969).
48. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2.
49. 39 Cal. 2d at 872, 250 P.2d at 606.




54. See text accompanying notes 4046 supra.
55. ASSE~mLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8056.
56. Id. at 8058. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
57. AssEmmLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8056.
58. Id. at 8056. See CAL. CODE Crv. PRO. §§ 1730-72 (West 1970); J. RYBURN &
M. EuIN, ATrORNEYS' READY REFERENCE TO THE CONCILIATION COURT (Los Angeles
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quirement of a judicial determination of the existence of alleged
grounds or reasons for divorce, but with major internal revisions to en-
able the courts to deal with the factual issues surrounding the marital
breakdown. 59
Prior law had merely listed certain acts (e.g., adultery, -intemper-
ance, etc.) which were conclusively presumed -to cause a breakdown
of the marriage without any inquiry into the specific relation of the act
to the breakdown or any proof required that the marriage had in fact
broken down irretrievably. 60 Furthermore, the prior procedure had
required that the court put its finger on the guilty party whose act or
condition had single-handedly caused the presumed breakdown.6"
Yet, as the Assembly Committee acknowledged:
A marriage is a delicate interpersonal relationship which may break
down for any number of reasons, usually a combination of circum-
stances involving responsibility-or perhaps the lack of it-on the part
of both parties. An act which may be considered wrongful or immoral
according to contemporary standards, and sufficient to constitute
grounds for divorce, might very well have been directly caused by a
course of conduct on the part of the other spouse which has not custom-
arily been characterized as wrongful. 62
Because the possible causes of marital breakdown often are multi-
ple, complex, overlapping, and non-discursive, the Assembly Com-
mittee chose to focus on the fact of a breakdown as the basis -for
dissolution, rather than attempting to formulate a mechanical list of
potential causes.63 The existence of a breakdown was to be determined
by an examination of the individual, subjective reactions of the par-
ties themselves.64 Therefore,
absolute refusal on the part of one spouse to live with the other, despite
a conciliatory attitude and effort on the part of the latter, was thought
by the great majority of the legislators and witnesses considering the
question to be a sufficient reason for dissolution. In that situation the
court could hardly justify a refusal to grant an order of dissolution since
the marriage certainly has broken down. Refusal would amount to a
County Bar Ass'n 1974); Elkin, Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of Disinte-
grating Families, 22 THE FAMImY COORDINATOR 63 (1973).
59. See text accompanying note 57 supra and notes 67-107 infra.
60. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8058. See text accompanying notes 8-26
supra.
61. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8057. See text accompanying notes 8-27
supra.
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legal perpetuation of a relationship which has ceased to exist in fact.05
But to allow the parties themselves, or even a third-party counselor,
to determine the fact of marital breakdown was believed to be an
impermissible encroachment on the judicial function.6
Thus, the FLA maintained a conclusively presumptive causational
approach to dissolution, establishing as the principal ground irrecon-
cilable differences "which have caused the irremediable breakdown
of the marriage.'67 "Irreconcilable differences" was defined as those
grounds which are determined by the court to be "substantial reasons
for not continuing the marriage and which make it appear that the mar-
riage should be dissolved." s  The legislature also retained incurable
insanity as -a separate and distinct ground.6 9 It was thought that one
who is incurably insane falls within a wholly different category than one
who provokes or otherwise causes an irreconcilable difference, 70 but
the legislature lowered the requisite period of insanity to one year.71
Thus, the umbrella concept of "irreconcilable differences" encom-
passes virtually everything that causes a marriage breakdown. 72  So
long as the irreconcilable differences have caused the irremediable
breakdown of the marriage, the ground is met since it is merely "de-
scriptive of the frame of mind of the spouses in a marriage which is
no longer viable. '7'  Therefore, the irreconcilable differences standard
is necessarily subjective. A situation which totally destroys one mar-
riage may occur in another without causing serious problems.74 Further-
more, the standard is satisfied if either spouse suffers an irretrievable
marriage breakdown.75
Consequently, the parties are required to plead and prove a ground
which must, by definition, demonstrate the existence of the marital
breakdown upon which dissolution is premised.73  But the judicial
function was not thereby relegated to mere ratification, for "the court
must . . . require proof of the grounds alleged . . . which make[s]
65. Id. at 8058.
66. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 8057.
70. Id.
71. Id. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 4510 (West 1970).
72. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4506(1), 4507 (West 1970).
73. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8057 (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 8058. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
76. See notes 59-61, 63-68, 72-75 supra and accompanying text,
460 [Vol. 7
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it appear that the marriage should be dissolved.' 'r7
By the elimination of fault grounds, the California Legislature had
hoped "to induce a conciliatory and uncharged atmosphere which
[would] facilitate resolution of the other issues and perhaps effect
a reconciliation.17 8  Although realizing that "[ilt [was] unrealistic
to expect to eliminate all the acrimony built up between the separat-
ing spouses, '79 the Assembly Committee believed that "the proce-
dures themselves [need] not add more divisiveness."8 0
The California Legislature therefore -proceeded to devise radically
new procedures designed to reduce the acrimony which 'had charac-
terized divorce proceedings under the prior law. 81 The term "di-
vorce" was itself eliminated and replaced by "dissolution of mar-
riage."8'  A neutral petition-In re the Marriage of M . and Mrs. X-
took the place of the adversary complaint, X v. X.13 The requirement
of a corroborating witness was repealed, 4 as were the former equitable
grounds for denial of divorce 5 (connivance,8 6 collusion,8 7 condo-
nation, 8 recrimination, 9 or limitation and lapse of time 0 ). But
77. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4507, 4511 (West 1970).
78. ASSE~mLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8058.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 8057.
82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4350 (West Supp. 1974).
83. Id. § 4503 (West 1970).
84. CAL. Civ. CODE § 130 (enacted 1872; amended, ch. 612, § 32, [1873-741 Cal.
Stat. 191; repealed, ch. 1608, § 3 [1969] Cal. Stat. 3313). See also ASSEMMLY RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 8059.
85. CAL. Civ. CODE § 111 (enacted 1872; repealed, ch. 1608, § 3, [1969] Cal. Stat.
3313).
86. CAL. Civ. CODE § 112 (enacted 1872; repealed, ch. 1608, § 3, [1969] Cal.
Stat. 3313). The former section read as follows: "Connivance is the corrupt consent
of one party to the commission of the acts of the other, constituting the cause of
divorce."
87. CAL. Cxv. CODE § 114 (enacted 1872; repealed, ch. 1608, § 3, [1969] Cal. Stat.
3313). The former section read as follows:
Collusion is an agreement between husband and wife that one of them shall com-
mit, or appear to have committed, . . . acts constituting a cause of divorce, for
the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce.
88. CAL. Civ. CODE § 115 (enacted 1872; repealed, ch. 1608, § 3, [1969] Cal. Stat.
3313). The former section read as follows: "Condonation is the conditional forgive-
ness of a matrimonial offense constituting a cause of divorce."
89. CAL. Civ. CODE § 122 (enacted 1872; repealed, ch. 1608, § 3, [1969] Cal. Stat.
3313). The former section read as follows: "Recrimination is a showing by the de-
fendant of any cause of divorce against the plaintiff, in bar of the plaintiff's cause
of divorce."
90. CAL. Crv. CODE § 124 (enacted 1872; amended, ch. 612, § 31, [1873-741 Cal.
Stat. 191; repealed, ch. 1608, § 3, [1969] Cal. Stat. 3313). The former section read as
follows:
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such basically cosmetic procedural changes by themselves did not ad-
dress the principal cause of bitterness and resentment: allegations of
spousal misconduct. Thus, the legislature strove to enable
[t]he court, counsel and the parties [to] rationally consider the mar-
riage relationship according to the irreconcilability standard without
... accusatory pleadings or testimony of bad or immoral acts com-
mitted by one of the parties. 91
For whatever reason introduced, the acrimonious effect of accusa-
tions of misconduct would remain unchanged. It was recognized
that marital breakdown might occur without fault on either side, for
the very existence of irreconcilable differences might hinge on one
spouse's belief in the other's fault.92  For this reason, the legislature
sought to assure that evidence of spousal fault would not unnecessarily
embitter the proceedings by providing:
[E]vidence of specific acts of misconduct is inadmissible except where
child custody is in issue or where the court deems such evidence neces-
sary to prove irreconcilability. 93
The legislature also empowered the California Judicial Council to
formulate rules establishing specific practices and procedures to imple-
ment the new Act,94 but the FLA as written seemed to meet all the
legislative aims. The parties were still required to plead and prove
the cause(s) of the requisite breakdown, determination of which was
still a judicial function.95 Yet, under the FLA, the possibility
of an erroneous judicial grant or denial of divorce was greatly re-
duced. Existence of the ground necessarily demonstrated the exist-
ence of the requisite breakdown,96 and a proper balance had appar-
ently been struck between the occasional need for proof of fault to
A divorce must be denied:
One-When the cause is adultery and the action is not commenced within two
years after the commission of the act of adultery, or after its discovery by the in-
jured party; or
Two-When the cause is conviction of felony, and the action is not commenced
before the expiration of two years after a pardon, or the termination of the period
of sentence.
Three-In all other cases when there is an unreasonable lapse of time before
the commencement of the action.
91. AssEmmLy REPORT, supra note 2, at 8058.
92. Id. at 8057.
93. Id. at 8059. See also CAL. Civ. CoDE § 4509 (West 1970). Does this language
mean that evidence other than specific acts of misconduct, similar to the prior type
of fault evidence, is admissible? This question has not been judicially considered. See
text accompanying notes 272-75 infra.
94. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8059.




establish the ground and the dual goals of reducing interspousal hos-
tility and encouraging reconciliation.
97
These goals are strongly reflected throughout the dissolution pro-
ceedings. A proceeding is commenced by the filing of a petition
in the superior court.98 In those counties which have established a
conciliation court, the petitioner must also complete and file a confi-
dential questionnaire. 9  A blank copy of the questionnaire must
be served with the summons and petition upon the other spouse, 1' ° who
in turn may complete and return the questionnaire.' The forms are
sent to the conciliation court and the superior court judge is generally
precluded from reviewing them."0 2
If either spouse had indicated that he or she desires counseling,
the conciliation court will request both parties to fill out a petition for
counseling. 0 3 Should the couple cooperate and reconcile, the case
97. Id.
98. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4503 (West 1970); CAL. R. Cr. 1223. While the dissolution
proceeding is pending, the superior court may order the husband or wife to pay a rea-
sonable amount for the support and maintenance of the other spouse and of any chil-
dren. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4357 (West Supp. 1974). See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 4359
(West Supp. 1974) which provides for ex parte protective orders while proceedings for
dissolution are pending.
In order to receive pendente lite support, a party must file an order to show cause
with the court which then determines the amount of support at a preliminary hearing.
ATroRNEY's GUIDE To FAmLmY LAw PRACrICE § 3.15 (C. Brosnahan & G. Colburn eds.
1972) [hereinafter cited as ATroRNEY's GuiDE]. A party need not prove that he or
she has a reasonable probability of success in order to be entitled to the pendente lite
support, costs, and attorney's fees which enable the party to proceed with the dissolu-
tion. Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Cal. 2d 735, 344 P.2d 295 (1959); Kalmus v. Kalmus,
103 Cal. App. 2d 405, 230 P.2d 57 (1951); Knox v. Knox, 88 Cal. App. 2d 666, 199
P.2d 766 (1948).
Although the order made at the preliminary proceeding is not suppose to prejudice the
rights of the parties with respect to any subsequent order which may be made at the
dissolution proceeding (CAL. Civ. CODE § 4357 (West Supp. 1974)), this is not neces-
sarily true, because usually a trial court will change the preliminary order only upon a
strong showing by the party of change of circumstances.
99. CAL. CEV. CODE § 4356 (West Supp. 1974); CAL. R. Cr. 1224, 1228. The con-
fidential questionnaire was recently abolished by the state legislature. The California
Judicial Council is now considering a new form which would merely ask if counseling
is requested by the party.
100. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4503 (West 1970).
101. Id. § 4356 (West Supp. 1974).
102. Upon the filing of the questionnaire, the clerk shall protect it from access
or inspection by unauthorized persons and shall promptly transfer it to the concil-
iation court.
CAL. R. Cr. 1228. Interview with Hon. Jack T. Ryburn, Supervising Judge, Los An-
geles County Superior Court, Family Law Department, in Los Angeles, July 12, 1973
[hereinafter cited as Ryburn Interview].
103. Interview with Meyer Elkin, M.S.W., Director, Family Counseling Services,
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will never appear on the superior court calendar.10 4 However, if
either spouse (usually the petitioner) refuses to attempt reconcilia-
tion or to even submit to counseling, the conciliation court is power-
less to force the issue further, and the case will come up on calendar
for trial in superior court.10 5
However, most, if not all, counties require confidential question-
naires whether or not a conciliation court has been established.1"0
In counties without such courts, any questionnaires required are neces-
sarily reviewed by the superior court judge, even though this examina-
tion is felt to affect his impartiality.Y"0
The Attorney's Guide to Family Law Act Practice"8 sets forth
sample questions of the type commonly asked the petitioner to estab-
lish irreconcilable differences at a default trial:
Q.1 You have stated that there are irreconcilable differences between
you and your spouse. Is it your belief that your marriage has
completely broken down?
Q.2 Do you believe that conciliation counseling, the assistance of this
court, or a waiting period can restore the marriage?1°''
Civil Code section 4508 requires that, if "the court finds that there
are irreconcilable differences which have caused the irremediable
breakdown of the marriage, it shall order the dissolution of the
marriage.' ' " Judges of the Los Angeles County Superior Court
interpret section 4508 to mean that dissolution should be granted if
the party answers "Yes" to Question 1, and "No' to Question 2, since
those answers evidence irreconcilability. 11 However, "if it appears
that there is a reasonable possibility of reconciliation, the court shall
Conciliation Court of the Superior Court, Los Angeles County, in Los Angeles, Mar.
27, 1974.
104. Ryburn Interview, supra note 102.
105. Id.
106. Id. See ATroNEY's Gurm, supra note 98, § 3.11 et seq. for a complete list of
counties in California which have conciliation courts.
107. Ryburn Interview, supra note 102. In this situation, the judge must act as both
the marriage counselor who reads the confidential questionnaire and as the impartial
judge who hears no evidence of misconduct. Id.
108. ArroRNEY's GutmE, supra note 98.
109. Id. § 3.24.
110. CAL. CIV. CoDE § 4508(a) (West 1970).
111. Rybum Interview, supra note 102; Interview with the Honorable Nancy Watson,
Judge, Los Angeles County Superior Court, Family Law Department, in Los Angeles,
June 26, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Watson Interview]; Interview with Commissioner
James Reese, Judge Pro Tem, Los Angeles County Superior Court, Family Law Depart-
ment, in Los Angeles, June 26, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Reese Interview].
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continue -the proceeding for a period not to exceed 30 days." '12  Thus,
if the party were to answer "No" to Question 1 and/or "Yes" to
Question 2, it would be evident that the party would like to attempt
a reconciliation with his or her spouse. Therefore, the court, in keep-
ing with the legislative policy favoring reconciliation, would send the
parties to conciliation court to determine if a 30-day extension for
counseling could save the marriage.11
3
Since default divorces are seldom appealed, the sufficiency of such
unilateral conclusionary testimony has never been expressly ratified at
the appellate level. 1 4 It would appear that the usual sparsity of
testimony is buttressed both by the absence of contradictory evidence
and by the judge's opportunity to further question the petitioner in or-
der to conclusively establish the existence of irreconcilable differ-
ences.
115
However, were one spouse to testify that there were irreconcilable
differences and the responding spouse to deny their existence, prob-
lems would apparently arise as to the parties' relative credibility and
as to the sufficiency of such conclusionary evidence to sustain a judg-
ment."10 The legislature specifically provided in Civil Code section
4509 that
evidence of specific acts of misconduct is improper and inadmissible,
except where it is determined by the court to be necessary to establish
the existence of irreconcilable differences."
7
The legislative intent, as evidenced by the Report of 1969 Divorce
Reform Legislation and the language of the Civil Code, would at first
glance seem to require factual, not conclusionary, testimony as to the
existence of irreconcilable differences in such situations."" How-
ever, the apparent contradiction embodied in a requirement of the
same sort of fault evidence, and resultant acrimony, which the FLA
was purportedly enacted to eliminate has been neatly avoided by trial
court judges." 9
112. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4508(a) (West 1970).
113. Rybum Interview, supra note 102.
114. No default dissolutions are appealed on the issue of sufficiency of the evidence
used to prove the grounds, as evidenced by the total absence of-any such reported cases,
due to waiver of the issue by the defaulting party. Dissolution being an in rem pro-
ceeding, the issue is waived, and the result is res judicata, even without actual notice
to the respondent. Christiana v. Rose, 100 Cal. App. 2d 46, 222 P.2d 891 (1950).
115. See text accompanying note 139 infra.
116. See notes 117-33 infra and accompanying text.
117. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4509 (West 1970) (emphasis added).
118. See text accompanying notes 66-77 supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 120-28 infra.
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The Honorable Jack T. Ryburn, 120 the Honorable Nancy B. Wat-
son,12 and Commissioner James Reese 22 all maintain that the affirma-
tion ,by one spouse and -the denial by the other that such differences
do exist is itself evidence of -irreconcilable differences. The judges
view this situation as one in which the marriage has obviously broken
down and should be dissolved because one party, for whatever reason,
does not want to remain married to the other.'
23
Commissioner Reese commented:
It takes -two people in a marriage to say "I do." If one party says "I
don't," then there is no marriage performed. This applies to dissolu-
tions, in that if one spouse says "I don't" (i.e., I don't want to stay
married), then there is no marriage either.'24
Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that 'the judges of the Los An-
geles County Superior Court, Family Law Department, read Civil
Code section 4509 to require that "evidence of specific acts of miscon-
duct shall be improper and inadmissible" whenever the existence of
irreconcilable differences has been controverted. In fact, the three
judges feel that the contested dissolution has ceased to exist.'32 In
actual practice, if one party claims that there are irreconcilable dif-
ferences, other evidence will seldom be admitted and a dissolution will
be granted, even should the other spouse attempt to deny the ground's
existence.126  There is thus really no material difference between
a default, or uncontested, proceeding and a contested one. In either
situation, the same testimony or proof is admitted.'27  However, the
three judges have each indicated that, if there is no "absolute refusal"
by either spouse to live with the other, dissolution will not be
granted.3.
28
Thus, the -trial courts have construed the FLA in such a manner
as to turn all dissolutions into basically ex parte actions. To require
120. Ryburn Interview, supra note 102.
121. Watson Interview, supra note 111.
122. Reese Interview, supra note 111.
123. Reese Interview, supra note 111; Ryburn Interview, supra note 102; Watson In-
terview, supra note 111.
124. Reese Interview, supra note 111.
125. Reese Interview, supra note 111; Rybum Interview, supra note 102; Watson
Interview, supra note 111.
126. Reese Interview, supra note 111; Rybum Interview, supra note 102; Watson
Interview, supra note 111.
127. Reese Interview, supra note 111; Rybum Interview, supra note 102; Watson
Interview, supra note 111.
128. Reese Interview, supra note 111; Ryburn Interview, supra note 102; Watson
Interview, supra note 111.
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the court to make its determination on the basis of uncontradicted
conclusionary testimony in all cases has, as a practical matter, made
the grant of dissolution au-tomatic. 129  This has engendered criticism
that the courts are operating a system of "divorce for the asking" in
clear contravention of the presumed legislative intent.1 0
Appellate review of trial court practices under the FLA has been vir-
tually non-existent. Grants of dissolution under the Act are seldom
appealed, except upon collateral matters such as child custody, spousal
or child support payments, and division of community property.' 3 ' In
fact, only once has the California Supreme Court dealt with the evi-
dentiary requirements for dissolution under the FLA. In re Mar-
riage of McKim' has been the court's sole opportunity to reaffirm
the judicial supervisory power over dissolution proceedings under the
FLA in order to prevent perfunctory dissolutions of marriage and to
help achieve the legislative goal of reconciliation."'
Ill. In re Marriage of McKim
The McKims were married in July, 1968, and separated two
months later. In October of the same year, Mrs. McKim filed for di-
vorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. Mr. McKim's default was
entered and the case then went off calendar. On February 17, 1970,
the pending action came up for hearing as a proceeding for disso-
lution of marriage on the ground of irreconcilable differences under
the new Family Law Act. Mrs. McKim was absent from the hearing,
and her attorney did not explain her absence nor did he produce her
testimony by affidavit or other means. The husband did not appear
as a party, but attended the hearing under subpoena as a witness for
the wife.' M4 His was the only testimony offered:
Q. Mr. McKim, you are the respondent in this case; is that correct?
A. Right.
Q. At the time the petition in this matter was filed, was it your belief
that there were irreconcilable differences between you and your
wife?
A. Right.
Q. Since that time, have you and your wife attempted to resolve these
differences?
129. See text accompanying notes 120-28 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 66-77 supra.
131. See note 114 supra.
132. 6 Cal. 3d 673, 493 P.2d 868, 100 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1972).
133. Id. at 681, 493 P.2d at 871, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
134. Id. at 678, 493 P.2d at 870, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
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A. Yes.
Q. In fact, you were reconciled for a period of time; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. That reconciliation did not work out?
A. No.
Q. Is it your opinion that at the present time there are irreconcilable
differences?
A. Right.
Q. Is it your opinion that any further waiting period or conciliation
would assist in saving this marriage?
A. No.
Q. As far as you are concerned, there is no longer a marriage?
A. No.'3 5
The trial court denied the dissolution, holding that the wife was
required to personally appear at the hearing and that the ground for
dissolution could not be proven by the husband who had defaulted
and whose testimony it held inadmissible as a matter of law. 30 The
trial court, therefore, never reached the issue of whether or not the
testimony was sufficient to establish the existence of irreconcilable dif-
ferences.' 37
The court of appeal reversed the trial court's decision. 138  In an
opinion by Justice Kingsley, the court stated that
[i]t is clear from the record that [the] dissolution was not denied be-
cause the court was not satisfied with the quality or the quantum of
proof; the action was taken solely because the proof came from the
wrong source. Had the [trial] court doubted that the differences ac-
tually were "irreconcilable," it had the power to cross-examine the
[husband] on his conclusionary testimony and, under [section] 4509,
to require the [husband] to amplify his conclusions by testimony as to
the specific matters which would support that conclusion.'3 9
Furthermore, the court of appeal determined that the trial court
had also based its denial on the fact that the McKims had agreed to a
divorce. 140  Under the prior law, such an agreement would have
constituted collusion, 141 a ground for denial. The appellate court, how-
ever, could
135. Id. at 678 n.3, 493 P.2d at 870 n.3, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 142 n.3.
136. Id. at 677-78, 493 P.2d at 870, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
137. Id. at 681, 493 P.2d at 873, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
138. 95 Cal. Rptr. 136-37 (1971).
139. Id. at 137-38 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).




see, in our present statute, nothing to suggest that there remains any
policy objection to an agreement by the parties to a marriage to the
fact that their differences are "irreconcilable" and that, therefore, it
should be dissolved.1
42
The California Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's deci-
sion and affirmed the trial court's denial of dissolution. 143  The ba-
sic issues which the supreme court sought to resolve in McKim were
identical to those upon which the lower courts had passed. First,
what quantum, type, and source of proof of irreconcilable differences
are required?1 44 Second, does the former policy against collusive
dissolutions of marriage continue to apply to proceedings under the
FLA?145
A. Measure and Source of Proof
Reaffirming the judiciary's supervisory power over dissolution pro-
ceedings, Chief Justice Wright, writing for the majority, observed
that the legislature had rejected the plan proposed by the Governor's
Commission,
under which the court would have been required to dissolve a marriage
on a showing that the parties had taken certain procedural steps and
that a certain period of time had passed.
1 46
Instead, the legislature had clearly intended that the court should de-
termine whether or not a marital breakdown had occurred.147  Since
"[t]he court cannot perform this contemplated function without evi-
dence as to the condition of the marriage,"' 4 evidence of irrecon-
cilable differences is obviously required in all cases.149 As the leg-
islature had mandated in Civil Code section 4511:
No decree of dissolution can be granted upon the default of one of the
parties ...but the court must. . . require proof of the grounds al-
leged, and such proof, if not -taken before the court, shall be by affi-
davit.150
Furthermore, section 4511, when read with sections 4506-51 and
142. Id. (footnote omitted).
143. 6 Cal. 3d 673, 684, 493 P.2d 868, 873, 100 Cal. Rptr. 140, 146.
144. See text accompanying notes 146-75 infra.
145. See text accompanying notes 176-94 infra.
146. 6 Cal. 3d at 679, 493 P.2d at 871, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 143; ASSEMBLY REPORT,
supra note 2, at 8058.
147. 6 Cal. 3d at 679, 493 P.2d at 871, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
148. Id. at 679, 493 P.2d at 871-72, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 143-44.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 679, 493 P.2d at 872, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
151. A court may decree a dissolution of the marriage or legal separation on either
of the following grounds, which shall be pleaded generally:
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4507152 and with rule 1237'11 of the California Rules of Court, requires
proof of (the ground defined as) "substantial reasons for not continu-
ing the marriage."' 54
This requirement or proof to the court's satisfaction is paramount,
overshadowing the legislature's other aims in enacting the FLA. For
[a]lthough the Legislature intended that as far as possible dissolution
proceedings should be nonadversary, eliminating acrimony, it did not
intend that findings of the existence of irreconcilable differences be
made perfunctorily.' 55
Such language clearly reveals that, in affirming the trial court's de-
nial of divorce, the supreme court also felt that the husband's testi-
mony had been, in some way, inadequate. Since the proffered testi-
mony was virtually identical -to the evidence on which dissolutions are
regularly granted, 156 McKim might be interpreted as holding that
more specific proof is required. Such an interpretation would lead to
an unfortunate result; the only way in which greater specificity could
be achieved would be by a general return to pre-FLA fault testimony
under section 4509's allowance of evidence of misconduct. IG
Moreover, the language calling for such an interpretation is dicta, for
the McKim court never reached the issue of the sufficiency of the
proof offered. 5 ' Rejection of the husband's testimony was based
(1) Irreconcilable differences, which have caused the irremediable breakdown of
the marriage.
(2) Incurable insanity.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West 1970).
152. Irreconcilable differences are those grounds which are determined by the
court to be substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage and which make
it appear that the marriage should be dissolved.
CAL. Cirv. CODE § 4507 (West 1970).
153. mhe clerk shall enter the respondents default upon proper application of
the petitioner and thereafter the petitioner may apply to the court for the relief
sought in the petition. The court shall require proof to be made of the facts stated
in the petition and may enter its judgment accordingly.
CAL. R. Cr. 1237.
154. CAL.. Civ. Co DE § 4507 (West 1970) (emphasis added).
155. 6 Cal. 3d at 679, 493 P.2d at 871, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 143. In re Marriage of
Higgason, 29 Cal. App. 3d 806, 106 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1973), further re-enforced the
court's supervisory role in protecting against perfunctory dissolutions by holding that
a guardian ad litem cannot bring a proceeding for dissolution.
156. See text accompanying notes 108-28 supra.
157. See Note, In re Marriage of McKim-Playacting and the New Family Law
Act, 4 Sw. U.L. REv. 325 (1972), which stated:
Unfortunately, McKim will not be remembered as a case which judicially under-
scored the enlightened provisions of the current law .... Instead, McKim will
be recalled as the case which imposed, and otherwise read into the current law,
certain restrictive requirements reminiscent of the "Pre-Family Law Act era."
Id.
158. 6 Cal. 3d at 681, 493 P.2d at 873, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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solely on its source:
[A] trial court must require the petitioner to appear personally and tes-
tify at the hearing unless, in exceptional circumstances where an ex-
planation of petitioner's absence is shown to the satisfaction of the
court, the court in its sound discretion permits the requisite proof to
be made by affidavit as recognized by section 4511.159
The court interpreted Civil Code section 4511 to require that the
petitioning party appear personally and testify at the hearing. 10
However, as the majority admitted, while seotion 4511 and rule 1237
both require proof of the grounds alleged, neither by its terms specif-
ically requires the petitioner to appear.161 The court relied on
subdivision four of former Code of Civil Procedure section 58512
(replaced by rule 1237) 163 which specifically excepted "cases which
involve the dissolution or annulment of marriage" from the statutory
authorization of judicial "use of affidavits, in lieu of personal testi-
mony, as to all or any part of the evidence or proof required or per-
mtted to be offered, received, or heard in such [default] cases."'
64
The court noted that
[tihis provision suggested a restraint upon the court's discretion to per-
mit the use of affidavits in dissolution proceedings and we find nothing
in rule 1237 suggesting an abrogation of this restrictive policy.' 65
But, even if the silence of rule 1237 does not suggest an abrogation
of the restrictive policy of the former specific exception, section 4511's
unqualified authorization of affidavits clearly contradicts past prac-
tice. 66 Strangely, however, the court interpreted section 4511's con-
tradiction of former practice as requiring adherence to former practice
"insofar as is practicable."' 167 Thus, the petitioner would not be re-
quired to appear "in exceptional circumstances where . . .the court
in its sound discretion permits the requisite proof to be made by affi-
davit ... ."168
This infusion of qualifications into section 4511's unqualified lan-
159. Id. at 682, 493 P.2d at 874, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
160. Id.
161. See text accompanying notes 150-59 supra.
162. CAL. CODE Clv. PRo. § 585(4) (West Supp. 1974); 6 Cal. 3d at 682, 493 P.2d at
873, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
163. 6 Cal. 3d at 681-82, 493 P.2d at 873, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
164. Id. at 682, 493 P.2d at 873, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
165. Id. at 682, 493 P.2d at 873-74, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
166. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4511 (West 1970). See note 150 supra and accompanying
text.
167. 6 Cal. 3d at 682, 493 P.2d at 874, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
168. Id.
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guage was also said to be supported by the court's reliance on prior
law. Although forced to admit that "[tlhe former law did not forbid
the granting of a divorce to an absent plaintiff,"' 69 the court stressed
that trial judges "as a matter of policy normally required that the plain-
tiff appear personally and testify in court .... -170 Therefore, McKim
apparently transforms a judicial "policy" under the former law into a
rule of law under the FLA. Further, by basing its decision upon the
contention that past law had been silently incorporated into the FLA,
the court was forced to incorporate other aspects of prior policy.171
Thus, the court conditionalized even the petitioner's duty to appear by
affidavit:
We further hold that in exceptional cases where the court deems it war-
ranted, it may receive in lieu of petitioner's testimony or affidavit the
testimony of other competent witnesses including the respondent.'72
While affirming the trial court's denial of dissolution, the supreme
court not only recognized but also proclaimed that
[n]othing in the Family Law Act or the Family Law Rules suggests
that the default of a party affects his competence as a witness or the
admissibility of his testimony as to any issue of which he has knowl-
edge. 73
Of course, when admitted by the court, "[s]uch testimony...
must be sufficient to enable the court to make the required find-
ings' 7 4 of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. It is this lan-
guage which may cause McKim to appear to hold that the testimony
of the husband was inadequate, irrespective of its source. However,
the supreme court then remanded the action to the trial court for
further proceedings since
[u]nnecessary hardship would result from denying relief to the wife be-
cause she . . . was unaware that the trial court in its discretion could
require that she testify in person or, if exceptional circumstances were
shown, by affidavit.' 75
Clearly, McKim was thus solely based on the source of the evidence,
not on its quality or on its quantum.
169. Id. at 681, 493 P.2d at 873, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 682, 493 P.2d at 874, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 681, 493 P.2d at 873, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
174. Id. at 682, 493 P.2d at 874, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 146.




The court of appeal had determined that dissolution had also been
denied since the McKims had agreed to divorce, but that no "policy
objection to an agreement . . . that their differences are 'irreconcil-
able"' remained under the FLA.'7 6 Whether or not the former
policy against collusive dissolutions was to continue was also appealed
to the supreme court.
177
Collusion had been defined by former Civil Code section 11471
ag
an agreement between husband and wife that one of them shall com-
mit, or appear to have committed, or to be represented in court as hav-
ing committed acts constituting a cause of divorce, for the purpose of
enabling the other to obtain a divorce.
179
Thus, under the former law, if the parties agreed to commit or testify
to an act constituting a ground for divorce and if the agreement became
known to the court, a denial of divorce on the ground of collusion was
mandated by former Civil Code section I 11.80
Although the supreme court acknowledged that "[tlhe Family Law
Act contains no express reference to collusion,"' 81 it also recog-
nized the judicial duty 'to deny an prevent perfunctory, or "carte
blanche," dissolutions because "[t]he public is interested in the mar-
riage relation and the maintenance of its integrity, as it is the founda-
tion of the social system . . ". . Hence, if the parties sought to
obtain a decree of dissolution by an agreement whereby "one of them
would present false evidence that their differences were irreconcilable
and their marriage had broken down irremediably,' 8 3 the court rea-
soned that that agreement would constitute a "fraud on the court."'8 4
Under the Family Law Act, the court, not the parties, must decide
whether the evidence adduced supports findings that irreconcilable dif-
ferences do exist and that the marriage has broken down irremediably
and should be dissolved.' 8 5
The requirement that the petitioning party appear and testify at the
176. 95 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
177. 6 Cal. 3d at 680, 493 P.2d at 872, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
178. See note 87 supra.
179. 6 Cal. 3d at 680, 493 P.2d at 872, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
180. See text accompanying notes 85-90 supra.
181. 6 Cal. 3d at 680, 493 P.2d at 872, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
182. Id., quoting Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87, 94 (1859).
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hearing was also the court's method of insuring that a fraud on the
court would not be perpetrated, since proof of the actual irreconcil-
ability of differences would be better guaranteed before a decree of
dissolution was granted.' 8  However, Justice Mosk argued in dis-
sent that -this requirement completely disregarded the "innovative spirit
and intent of the Family Law Act.' 18 7  By continuing to apply the
former policy against collusive dissolutions as "fraud on the court"
under the FLA, Justice Mosk felt that the court was disregarding the
legislative intent that the courts do their utmost to effect a healing of
marital ,wounds by eliminating acrimony in the proceeding. 8 8  Ad-
mittedly, the purpose behind the FLA was to deal rationally and realis-
tically with marital breakdown ,and to avoid accusatory pleadings and
testimony.1
8 9
The majority also recognized this, as it quoted from the Report of
1969 Divorce Reform Legislation:
By requiring the consideration of the marriage as a whole and making
the possibility of reconciliation the important issue, the intent is to in-
duce a conciliatory and uncharged atmosphere which will facilitate reso-
lution of the other issues and perhaps effect a reconciliation. 90
It is thus clear that the court will allow parties to reach a rational
agreement that their differences are irreconcilable and that their mar-
riage should be dissolved. It merely requires more than an agreement
between the spouses to prove irreconcilable differences. 9' The legis-
lature clearly indicated that the requisite findings were to be made by
the trial court. 912  Acceptance of the spouses' determination as suffi-
cient evidence would be an impermissible delegation of the judicial
function. 93  Acceptance of an agreement knowingly made without
irreconcilable differences would be to allow a "fraud on the court."'' 4
To require other proof does not prohibit interspousal agreements; it
merely limits them to their proper function.
Another possible rationale for ,the McKim holding is to regard the
matter as a procedural deficiency. "Irreconcilable differences," the
186. Id. at 681, 493 P.2d at 873, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
187. Id. at 685, 493 P.2d at 875, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
188. Id.
189. See notes 78-80, 91-93 supra and accompanying text.
190. 6 Cal. 3d at 679, 493 P.2d at 871, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 143, quoting AssEmmLy
RiEPORT, supra note 2, at 8058.
191. 6 Cal. 3d at 680, 493 P.2d at 872, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
192. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8058.
193. Id.
194. 6 Cal. 3d at 680, 493 P.2d at 872, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
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ground to be proven, is "descriptive of the frame of mind" of a spouse
in a marriage which is no longer viable. 195  Either or both spouses
may feel that such differences are present; the belief need not be
shared by both parties.198
In McKim, the husband had defaulted, alleging neither the existence
nor the non-existence of irreconcilable differences.' 97 Thus, the sole
issue was whether or not the wife believed that the ground was pres-
ent.'98 The husband's testimony, however, related solely to his own
feelings, matters not in issue.' 99 As noted previously, such testi-
mony by a petitioner (or cross-petitioner) would normally result in
dissolution.200 Coming from a defaulting party and relating to his
own unalleged feelings and beliefs, the testimony is immaterial and ir-
relevant.
20'
Thus, the supreme court's requirement that the petitioner testify is a
recognition that subjective attitudes and feelings can best be proven
by their possessor. The preference for personal testimony over affi-
davits serves to guarantee the trial court a view of the petitioner's
demeanor and an opportunity to more extensively examine the witness
through questioning.202 Yet, as the court recognized, such attitudes
can be proven by testimony of a defaulting spouse "to any issue of
which he has knowledge. 2 08  Thus, assuming an adequate showing of
exceptional circumstances, the husband's testimony would have been
in all ways perfectly adequate had the word "wife's" merely been added
after "your" in the four questions relating to opinion or belief.
204
195. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8057.
196. Id. at 8058. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
197. 6 Cal. 3d at 676-77, 493 P.2d at 869-70, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 141-42.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 677 n.3, 493 P.2d at 870 n.3, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 142 n.3. See text accom-
panying note 135 supra.
200. See notes 108-13, 123-28 supra and accompanying text.
201. See notes 197-200 supra and accompanying text.
202. 13 CAL. JuR. 2d Courts § 113 (1954).
203. 6 Cal. 3d at 681, 493 P.2d at 873, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (emphasis added).
204. See notes 197-203 supra and accompanying text. Although clearly hearsay, such
testimony by a defaulting respondent would nevertheless be admissible since
evidence of a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind . . . is
not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when
(1) . . . [O]ffered to prove the declarant's state of mind . . . when it is
itself an issue in the action; or
(2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declar-
ant.
CAL. EviD. CODE § 1250(a) (West 1968). "Statement," of course, includes both "oral
or written verbal expression" and "nonverbal conduct. . . intended. . . as a substitute
for oral or written verbal expression." Id. § 225.
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IV. DUE PROCESS-VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS STANDARD
Apart from issues as to the quantum and source of evidence adduced
to prove irreconcilable differences, ostensibly answered by McKim, 20 r
questions have also been raised as to whether or not trial court practice
under the FLA complies with the requirements of constitutional due
process. As -will be seen, although the Act has been held not to be
unconstitutionally vague,20 6 the adequacy of its compliance with the re-
quirements of procedural due process is at best questionable.20 7
Due process of law as provided by the fourteenth amendment 20
8
is violated if a statute affecting a person's rights is unreasonably uncer-
tain or ambiguous.20 As a matter of fundamental fairness, a per-
son is entitled to know reasonably what he or she can or cannot do.210
"Civil as well as criminal statutes must be sufficiently clear as to...
provide a standard or guide against which conduct can be uniformly
judged by courts ... ."I" Therefore, a statute which is vague
to the extent that it does not provide a proper definition of its terms
works a denial of due process since fair notice is not given of the terms
by which the statute will be followed.212
Professor Max Rheinstein, in his book Marriage, Stability, Divorce
and the Law,21 3 has attacked the California Family Law Act on the
ground that sections 4506, 4507, and 4508 are unconstitutionally
vague. 1 4 Professor Rheinstein maintains that a literal application
of these statutes "is impossible" 21 r5 and that "[a]ny court may give
. . . ["marriage breakdown" and "irreconcilable differences"] almost
any meaning."
216
If the statute was meant to provide for -the termination of the marriage
bond in the case of the factual breakdown of the marital community
205. See notes 134-204 supra and accompanying text.
206. See notes 208-66 infra and accompanying text.
207. See notes 267-78 infra and accompanying text.
208. The fourteenth amendment reads, in pertinent part: "[Nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
209. In re Marriage of Walton, 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 115-16, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472,
478-79 (1972).
210. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
211. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 231, 461 P.2d 375, 387, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 175, 187 (1969).
212. Id.
213. M. RHEiNsTmN, MARIAGE, STABrtrry, DIVORCE AND THE LAw 367 (1972).





of life, it fails to indicate any standard by which one is to determine
the meaning of the vague term of marriage breakdown. But the text
makes things worse by requiring that the breakdown be "irremediable"
If one were to take literally the word "irremediable" no mar-
riage could ever be judicially dissolved .... Even in the case of a
profoundly deep split in the marital community, the possibility of recon-
ciliation is never completely excluded, even though the probability may
be as low as one-hundredth of 1 percent. So what is meant in the stat-
ute is obviously a marriage breakdown with a low probability of being
remedied. But how low must the probability be: 20 percent, or 10,
or 1, or 49?217
Professor Rheinstein followed with a similar criticism of "irrecon-
cilable differences," the ground for dissolution, as being too vague.21 8
He also questioned the standard the courts are to apply in deciding
whether or not to grant a dissolution-whether or not there are in
fact "substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage."21 9  Nar-
rowing the possible interpretations of this language to a determination
of either "the substantiality of the reasons for the parties discontinu-
ing their marital life" or "the sufficiency of the reasons for the judicial
termination of the bond,"220 Rheinstein maintained that a court would
find no real guidance as to the meaning of substantiality from either
interpretation of the statute. 21
Rheinstein characterized Civil Code section 4508 as being so vague
as to be a "riddle. 2 2  He interpreted this section to mean:
If the court finds that there are truly irreconcilable differences which
* have caused the truly irremediable breakdown of the parties' marital
life, the court shall order the dissolution of the marriage. But if it ap-
pears to the court that the differences are not irreconcilable, it shall
continue the proceeding for a period not to exceed thirty days. Then,
when that period has expired, either party may move for the dissolution
of the marriage and the court may enter its judgment decreeing such
dissolution.223
Rheinstein also questioned whether or not the court could dissolve the
marriage if it found that the marriage had not truly broken down ir-
remediably, and whether or not the fact that the parties had thus far
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 370.
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failed to reconcile was sufficiently irrefutable evidence of irremediabil-
ity.224  Thus, he hinted that courts will circumvent the correct and
intended meanings, as he interpreted them, of these statutes, and would
therefore "dissolve a marriage upon the unilateral motion of one
party when it has found that the marriage has not irremediably bro-
ken down. 2
25
It would thus seem that statutory vagueness is not really the issue
raised by Professor Rheinstein. As he has interpreted the relevant
provisions of the FLA, the requisite conditions for dissolution are
crystal clear. The problem is that it is virtually impossible that
they could occur, much less that they could be conclusively proven.
Thus he fears that trial courts will formulate their own more-attainable
standards, and that they will do so unevenly, uncertainly, vaguely. Any
vagueness in the application of standards so completely outside the
scope of legislative authorization would seem to be, at best, a secon-
dary issue.226
Nevertheless, the point is well taken that, if "irretrievable marriage
breakdown'" and "irreconcilable differences" were intended to denote
circumstances capable of attainment or occurrence, the standards may
be too uncertain to assure uniform application. The issue of vagueness
has been raised in two appellate court cases, In re Marriage of Cos-
grove22 7 and In re Marriage of Walton,22s in each of which the re-
spondent wife appealed from an interlocutory judgment granting the
husband's petitioA for dissolution of the marriage.220 Mrs. Walton
argued that the ground of irreconcilable differences as set forth in Civil
Code sections 4506(1) and 4507 is too vague and ambiguous to assure
uniform application. 8 0 Mrs. Cosgrove also claimed that the FLA
224. Id.
225. Id. at 371-72.
226. See note 202 supra.
227. 27 Cal. App. 3d 424, 103 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1972).
228. 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1972).
229. Id. at 110, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 475; 27 Cal. App. 3d at 426, 103 Cal. Rptr. at
734.
230. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 111, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 475. Mrs. Walton had also as-
serted that the substitution of irreconcilable differences for the prior fault grounds
worked an unconstitutional impairment of the obligations of the marital contract in
marriages celebrated before the enactment of the FLA. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 111, 104
Cal. Rptr. at 475. Both the United States Constitution and the California Constitution
guarantee that no law impairing the obligation of contracts is ever to be passed.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16. Civil Code section 4100 defines
marriage as "a personal relation arising out of a civil contract," CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100
(West 1970), and section 5100 states that the parties "contract toward each other obli-
gations of mutual respect, fidelity, and support." CAL. CIv. CODE § 5100 (West 1970).
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was unconstitutionally vague because "'absolutely no ground rules or
The California Supreme Court stated, in Mott v. Mott, 82 Cal. 413, 22 P. 1140 (1890),
that
[tlhe contract of marriage creates a status . . . by reason of which the law im-
poses upon each party to the contract certain duties and obligations, the violation
of which constitutes a breach of the contract and gives a cause of action.
Id. at 418, 22 P. at 1141. However, as the Walton court of appeal stated, "marital
rights and obligations are not contractual rights and obligations within the meaning of
article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution or article I, section 16, of the
California Constitution," because "[m]arriage is much more than a civil contract; it
is a relationship that may be created and terminated only with the consent of the state
and in which the state has a vital interest." 28 Cal. App. 3d at 112, 104 Cal. Rptr.
at 475-76.
This holding represents long-settled law in the area. As early as 1888, the United
States Supreme Court held in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), that "marriage
is not a contract within the meaning of the [constitutional] prohibition." Id. at 210.
Justice Field noted that:
The provision of the Constitution never has been understood to embrace other con-
tracts than those which respect property or some object of value, and confer rights
which may be asserted in a court of justice. It never has been understood to re-
strict the general right of the legislature to legislate on the subject of divorces.
Id., paraphrasing Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518, 629 (1819).
"The contracts designed to be protected by the tenth section of the first article
of . . . [the Constitution] are contracts by which perfect rights, certain, definite,
fixed private rights of property are vested."
125 U.S. at 210, quoting Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402, 416 (1850).
Thus, the Maynard Court concluded that, rather than a contract within the meaning
of the contract clause of the Constitution, marriage was "a social relation,...
the obligations of which arise not from the consent of concurring minds, but are the
creation of the law itself . . . ." 125 U.S. at 211. In fact, marriage was viewed as
"more than a mere contract," but rather "an institution, . . . the maintenance of which
in its purity the public is deeply interested." Id. at 210-11 (emphasis added).
Additionally, the Walton court reasoned that,
even if marital obligations were treated as contractual obligations protected by the
constitutional prohibitions, a statutory change in the grounds for divorce would not
constitute an unconstitutional impairment thereof.
28 Cal. App. 3d at 112, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 476. A contrary position has long been
held by the California Supreme Court regarding the impairment of contracts in general:
As the law enters into the contract, and forms a part of it, the obligation of
such contract must depend upon the law existing at the time the contract was
made. The contract, being then, complete and operative the Legislature cannot,
by a subsequent act, impair its obligation, by requiring the performance of other
conditions, not required by the law of the contract itself.
Robinson v. Magee, 9 Cal. 81, 84 (1858). However, as the Walton court recognized:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do
with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always
been subject to the control of the Legislature. That body prescribes the age at
which parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute
marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights
of both, present and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds for
its dissolution.
28 Cal. App. 3d at 112, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 476, quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,
205 (1888).
Walton is obviously based upon the simple proposition that the legislature of a state
cannot "'bargain away the public health or the public morals."' Home Bldg. & Loan
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guidelines are laid down in the statute as to what constitutes irrecon-
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 436 (1934). As the Court indicated in Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914):
[It is settled that neither the "contract" clause nor the "due process" clause has
the effect of overriding the power of the state to establish all regulations that are
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general
welfare of the community; that this power can neither be abdicated nor bargained
away, and is inalienable even by express grant; and all contract and property rights
are held subject to its fair exercise.
Id. at 558. The power of the legislature concerning marriage is plenary; this power
cannot be diminished by its exercise. Thus, at marriage, the spouses enter into a con-
tract deemed to incorporate and contemplate both existing law and "the reserve power
of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pur-
suance of public policy. . . ." 28 Cal. App. 3d at 112, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 476. Such
legislative enactments or amendments would not constitute an unconstitutional impair-
ment of contractual obligations. The Walton court thus upheld the "impairment" based
on Maynard and the state's police power.
Although the United States Supreme Court's Maynard holding seems definitive as to
the inapplicability of the contract clause to marital status, the permissibility of retroac-
tive application of the FLA to previously-acquired marital community property is still
an open question. This is especially so since "[u]nder the concept of divisible divorce,
financial responsibility and marital status may be separately litigated at different times
and in different forums" and since "divisible divorce is a part of the public policy of
this state." Lopez v. Lopez, 63 Cal. 2d 735, 737, 408 P.2d 744, 746, 48 Cal. Rptr.
136, 138 (1965). See also Faught v. Faught, 30 Cal. App. 3d 875, 106 Cal. Rptr.
751 (1973); In re Marriage of Stuart, 27 Cal. App. 3d 834, 104 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1972).
Civil Code section 5105 decrees that: "The respective interests of the husband and
wife in community property during continuance of the marriage relation are present,
existing and equal interests . . . ." CAL. Civ. CoDE § 5105 (West 1970). This has
been held to create in each spouse a vested one-half interest in each item of commun-
ity property. Sidebotham v. Robison, 216 F.2d 816, 830 (9th Cir. 1955); Brooks v.
United States, 84 F. Supp. 622, 625 (S.D. Cal. 1949). Since the FLA mandates an
equal division of community property on dissolution, CAL. CIv. CODB § 4800 (West
Supp. 1974), each spouse is divested of his one-half interest in one half of the items
of community property. (Of course, such a spouse receives the other's one-half interest
in the remainder.) Retroactive modification of the terms and conditions under which
a spouse can be so deprived does not violate either the federal fourteenth amendment
or article I, section 1, of the California Constitution as a deprivation of property with-
out due process. See, e.g., Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1965).
But California courts have held that, as a rule of property, community property laws
cannot be applied retroactively. See, e.g., Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 623, 145 P.2d
312, 318 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48
P. 228 (1897); Armstrong, "Prospective" Application of Changes in Community Prop.
erty Control-Rule of Property or Constitutional Necessity?, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 476
(1945). In McKay v. Lauriston, 204 Cal. 557, 269 P. 519 (1928), the supreme court
stated
that amendments whereby it [is] sought to lessen, enlarge or change in any man-
ner the rights of the respective spouses in community property will not be given
retroactive effect so as to affect the respective rights of the parties in community
property acquired prior to the enactment of such amendments.
Id. at 566, 269 P. at 523 (citations omitted). Hence, "the law in force at the date
of the acquisition of the property is determinative of the rights of the parties therein."
Id. at 567, 269 P. at 523. That a change in the requirements for divestment of these
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cilable differences.' ",231 She argued that this has resulted in marriage
being dissolved "'on the whim and caprice of the particular
judge,' "232 and, therefore, that the function of dissolving marriages
had been delegated "'to any litigant who wants to have his or her mar-
riage dissolved and to the absolute discretion of the courts .... "',233
Replying to the contentions of unconstitutional vagueness, Justice
Kaufman, in Walton, found no unreasonable uncertainty or ambiguity
in the section's language. 234  "[Rileasonable certainty is all that is re-
quired,"235 and "[a) statute will be upheld if its terms may be made
reasonably certain by reference to its legislative history or purpose.1236
The Walton court referred to the legislative intent as found in the As-
sembly Report: "[irreconcilable differences] is . . .descriptive of the
frame of mind of the spouses in a marriage which is no longer vi-
able. 23 7  Irreconcilable differences was thus to be a subjective stand-
ard, not to be necessarily found "in the form of observable acts and
occurrences such as marital quarrels . *.".. ,23 The Walton court
found that this standard was not unconstitutionally vague, even
though "the court must depend -to a considerable extent upon the sub-
jective state of mind of the parties." 23 9  Reliance on McKim further
re-enforced the fact that it was the court, and not the parties, which
must decide whether or not the evidence adduced supported a finding
of irreconcilable differences, even though a subjective standard was
used.240  Thus the parties were prevented from injecting their own
definition of irreconcilable differences into the determination. How-
vested rights fits within the McKay prohibition would seem virtually axiomatic.
It has been held, however, that the FLA does not deprive a spouse of a vested right
in its substitution of mandatory equal property division for the unequal division which
prior law required to favor the "innocent" spouse. In re Marriage of Silvers, 23 Cal.
App. 3d 910, 100 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1972). Silvers is clearly based on the well-
established principle that "any partial or incomplete right becomes vested only when
reduced to a judgment and no person has a vested right in an unenforced pen-
alty." Id. at 911, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 731 (citations omitted). A retroactive modifica-
tion of vested community property rights is clearly distinguishable and impermissible
under well-established California law.
231. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 429, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 116, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 478-79.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id., quoting ASSEmBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8057 (emphasis added).
238. Innocence, supra note 2, at 1319.
239. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 117, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
240. Id.
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ever, Walton did perceive some difficulty in the language of Civil Code
section 4507,241 which
[could] be read . . . as meaning that irreconcilable differences are
whatever substantial reasons the court finds for not continuing the mar-
riage and which make it appear that the marriage should be dissolved.24
2
Such an apparently limitless grant of discretion to the trial courts
would result in unconstitutional vagueness by circumventing section
4506(1)'s requirement that an irretrievable breakdown has occurred.
However, "[w]here possible, statutes are construed to avoid uncon-
stitutionality. '24 3  Thus, "to achieve harmony and to give effect to
the legislative intent and to all of the parts so far as possible, ' 244 sec-
tions 4506(1) and 4507 were construed together. Rather than cir-
cumventing the standard of section 4506(1), 4507 served "to make
clear that the irreconcilable differences [specified by section 4506(1)]
...must be substantial as opposed to trivial or minor. ' 245  By thus
further conditionalizing the 4506(1) standard, 4507 was held to add
specificity to "irreconcilable differences" and adequate constitutional
clarity was perceived.
Since, however, "irreconcilable differences" are defined in terms of
the "irremediable breakdown of the marriage" which they must
cause,2 46 vagueness of the latter term would also be fatal to the
standard. Although no allegation of vagueness was made in Cos-
grove, the court of appeal pointed to the specificity of the phrase "mar-
ital breakdown. ' 24 7  The Assembly Report had adopted the De
Burgh rationale that divorce should be granted when
241. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4507 (West 1970), reprinted in full in note 152 supra.
242. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 117, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
243. Id., 104 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 118, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 480. As the court noted, the primary purpose
of section 4507 is to indicate that the determination of irreconcilable differences is to
be a judicial, not a ministerial, function. Id. at 117-18, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 479-80.
246. See text accompanying notes 67-75 supra.
247. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 429, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 736. The court said that
Itihe guidelines for the proof and determination of the existence of "irreconcilable
differences" are no more lacking in the present law than were the guidelines for
the determination of fault under the former law.
Id. A similar rationale is found in People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1973), in which Penal Code section 311.2, California's present obscenity
statute, was upheld as constitutional:
[I]f a claim is made that retention of section 311's requirement that a work be
"utterly without redeeming social importance" renders the statute fatally vague,
we think the answer is that it is no more vague than the phrases upheld against
[prior] challenge, . . . or for that matter, than the predecessor language of
section 311 upheld against an attack of vagueness ....
Id. at 912, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 441 (citations and footnote omitted).
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the purposes of family life are no longer served . [and] " .
[w]here the relations between husband and wife are such that the
legitimate objects of matrimony have been utterly destroyed." 248
By defining "irremediable [marital] breakdown" in such terms,
both that effect and the causational "irreconcilable differences" have
sufficient clarity to withstand an allegation of unconstitutional vague-
ness. One may not, of course, foresee or statutorily define all the pos-
sible causes of a breakdown. That is not necessary. When the requi-
site effect has occurred, the precise nature of the cause is immaterial
to the satisfaction of due process.
249
Assertions may, of course, be made, and properly so, that the actual
trial court practice does not maintain the precision of the statutory
standard. A petitioner's allegation of "irreconcilable differences" does
not necessarily signify marital breakdown. Even if it did, the determi-
nation is for the court. 250  Acceptance of such a conelusionary allega-
tion, without more, would impermissibly delegate the judicial decisional
process to the petitioner; but, as noted previously, courts adamantly op-
pose the introduction of evidence of specific acts of misconduct.251
In a contested proceeding, the contradictory assertions of the par-
ties may, as the courts believe, furnish adequate proof of irreconcil-
able differences.. ) Yet, most proceedings are by default. To
grant dissolution on an uncontested and unaccompanied assertion of
"irreconcilable differences" would impermissibly grant the right of de-
cision to the petitioner. More is required.
2 53
In a contested proceeding, the contradictory assertions of the par-
quired, a comparison might be drawn between the California no-fault
system and the present English system of divorce. Under the Di-
vorce Reform Act of 1969,254 there is only one ground upon which a
person may petition for divorce in England: that the marriage has
broken down irretrievably.8 5 Since the FLA's ground of irreconcil-
248. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8055, quoting De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39
Cal. 2d 858, 864, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (1952).
249. See notes 67-77 supra and accompanying text.
250. CAL. CrV. CODE § 4511 (West 1970). See text accompanying notes 148-55 su-
pra; see also In re Marriage of McKim, 6 Cal. 3d 673, 679, 493 P.2d 868, 871, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 140, 143-44 (1972).
251. See text accompanying notes 116-27 supra.
252. See text accompanying notes 120-27 supra.
253. See text accompanying notes 146-86 supra.
254. Divorce Reform Act 1969, c. 55. See Rosenbaum, Divorce Reform in Eng-
land: The Decline of the Matrimonial Offense, 12 J. FAMILY L. 365 (1972-73).
255. Divorce Reform Act 1969, c. 55, section 1 of which reads as follows:
After the commencement of this Act the sole ground on which a petition for di-
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able differences is defined solely in terms of resultant irretrievable
breakdown, the two grounds are virtually identical. The English
ground, however, is proven only if the petitioner satisfies the court of
the existence of at least one of five specified guideline-facts 256 which
closely resemble the former grounds of divorce in California. The pe-
titioner must introduce evidence to prove (1) adultery causing con-
tinued cohabitation which is alleged to be intolerable, 57 (2) that the
petitioner cannot reasonably 'be expected to live with the respondent,
258
(3) desertion,2 9 (4) a two-year separation with the respondent's con-
sent to divorce,2 0 or (5) a five-year separation.2 1  Thus, the English
Divorce Reform Act provides the court with factual guidelines to de-
termine the causation of the parliamentarily-approved ground for di-
vorce.
It is, of course, not suggested that the California system adopt and
apply the English guideline-facts. Facts (1) and (3) clearly call for
the proof of fault, the elimination of which was the prime goal of the
FLA.262  Facts (4) and (5) provide for divorce by mutual spousal
consent or by purely ministerial judicial procedures after the lapse of a
certain period of time. Either method as a basis for dissolution was re-
jected by the California Legislature even more strongly than was proof
of fault.263 Fact (2), a catch-all provision, is virtually identical to
the California requirement of proof of irreconcilable differences and
would in no way augment or improve present practice.
264
Nevertheless, the basic principle of guideline-facts would be useful
if adapted to the California statute. However, rather than causational
facts, proof of "effect-facts" should be required. An allegation by a
petitioner of irreconcilable differences is all very well, but may not sig-
nify the requisite marital breakdown. Testimony that the petitioner re-
vorce may be presented to the court by either party to a marriage shall be that
the marriage has broken down irretrievably.
256. Id. § 2.
257. Id. § 2(a).
258. Id. § 2(b).
259. Id.'§ 2(c). Desertion for a continuous period of two years is required. Id.
260. Id. § 2(d).
261. Id. § 2(e).
262. See text accompanying notes 48-127 supra.
263. See ASSE MLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8058.
264. In practical fact, it is uncertain whether the English standard of "reasonable-
ness" was intended to establish an objective or a subjective standard, which could make
the divorce determination either relatively easy or difficult for the petitioner to obtain.
The question was resolved in California by the specific determination that "irreconcil-




fuses to continue to live with the respondent and believes that reconcil-
iation will not occur26 5 would, however, clearly demonstrate the oc-
currence of a breakdown but would not require proof of fault or other
misconduct. In fact, these two facts were themselves suggested by the
legislature as being demonstrative of the occurrence of breakdown.266
Thus, trial courts should require proof of sufficient resultant facts to
assure that the differences alleged are irreconcilable as the legislature
defined, that term of art. Only thus will the adequate clarity of the
statute be sustained in its application.
V. DENIAL OP PROCEDURAL DuE PRocEss
A question which has yet to be considered by California appellate
courts involves the situation in which the respondent in an action for
dissolution of marriage would assert the non-existence of substantial
irreconcilable differences and, in fact, would attempt to introduce evi-
dence to prove the allegation.267  Procedural due process under the
fourteenth amendment speoifies that "[p]arties whose rights are to
be affected are entitled to be heard .... ,,21s Allowance of a re-
spondent's conclusionary allegation denying the existence of the ground
is clearly not enough. "[Tjhere is no hearing when the party . . . is
not given an opportunity to test, explain, or refute."2 69
The Family Law Act expressly prohibits evidence of specific acts of
misconduct except "where it is determined by the court to be neces-
sary to establish the existence of irreconcilable differences. 217 0  Yet,
as previously discussed, the belief of trial courts, at least in Los Ange-
les County, is that a contradiction in allegations as to irreconcilable dif-
ferences is itself evidence of irreconcilable differences which often has
prevented any contradictory evidence from being admitted. This ex-
265. See text accompanying notes 108-28 supra.
266. See ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8058. See text accompanying note 65
supra.
267. While both In re Marriage of Cosgrove (see note 227 supra) and In re Marriage
of Walton (see note 228 supra) dealt with "contested" dissolutions, neither contestant
denied the existence of irreconcilable differences. Further, in neither case was there an
attempt to cross-examine the petitioner, nor was objection made to the petitioners' con-
clusionary testimony, which would have preserved the appellants' records for appeal.
268. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972), quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 222, 233 (1863).
269. ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913).
270. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 4509 (West 1970).
271. See text accompanying notes 120-27 supra. The Honorable Jack T. Ryburn has
stated that "testimony should be taken to determine the validity" of a parties contention
regarding irreconcilable differences, if necessary. Letter from Judge Jack T. Ryburm to
Elayne Berg, Aug. 8, 1974.
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elusion of all but conclusionary testimony from contested proceedings
is not only statutorily unwarranted, but denies procedural due process
to the respondent as well.
Trial judges believe that evidence of irreconcilable differences is pro-
vided by contradictory allegations as to their existence. Thus, in any
contested case, section 4509 would allow them to exclude evidence of
specific misconduct.27 2 Although contestation may be the best evi-
dence of a spousal disagreement, it provides no further proof of the
occurrence of a marital breakdown than would a petitioner's uncon-
tested allegation.
Even accepting the hypothesis that mere contestation adequately
proves the ground to the court, the ban of section 4509 extends only to
"evidence of specific acts of misconduct." Although an attempt to dis-
prove the existence of irreconcilable differences might conceivably in-
clude allegdtions of the petitioner's misconduct, it would seem more
likely that such a defense would comprise proof of specific spousal
good conduct or general allegations of interspousal amity. Such evi-
dence is not made inadmissible by section 4509 under any circum-
stances.27 3
Of course, beyond compliance with section 4509, the evidence must
have relevance.274 In such a contested proceeding, the irreconcil-
able differences alleged comprise solely -the subjective state of mind of
the petitioner. 7 5  The evidence proffered must therefore relate
thereto and not to the beliefs and opinions of the respondent which tech-
nically are not in issue. It is not enough, or even required, that the
respondent think that everything is satisfactory. He must show that
that is what the petitioner really believes or that contrary beliefs of the
petitioner are transitory.
For the respondent to successfully so defend would, admittedly, be
virtually impossible. Any attempt to show the court that the peti-
tioner's sentiments are too inconstant, too alternating for irreconcilable
differences to be conclusively found, would be wrecked on the shoals
of practicality. An average minimum period of three months elapses
between the filing of a petition for dissolution and the actual hear-
ing,276 far too long a time to sustain an assertion of mercurialness.
272. CAL. Crv. CODE § 4509 (West 1970) (reprinted in relevant part in text accom-
panying note 117 supra). See notes 120-27 supra and accompanying text.
273. See notes 267-72 supra and accompanying text.
274. "No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence." CAL. EVID. CODE § 350
(West 1968).
275. See notes 197-204 supra and accompanying text.
276. Ryburn Interview, supra note 102.
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Likewise, an attempt to prove a constant lack of irreconcilable dif-
ferences would also be virtually doomed. Such would amount to
proof of an attempted "fraud on the court. ' 27 7  Yet the legislature
has provided that an absolute refusal to' live with the other spouse
adequately demonstrates an irreconcilable difference. What is the fil-
ing of a petition for dissolution if not such a refusal? The respondent
is placed in the difficult position of having to prove that the petitioner
really does not want what he or she is so strongly demanding.
Yet, however uncommonly rare the potential for success, proced-
ural due process requires that the court allow the attempt to be made.
Provided that section 4509's stricture on the proof of specific miscon-
duct is observed, respondents must be allowed to contest the exist-
ence of irreconcilable differences.2
VI. CONCLUSION
The Family Law Act has been in force over four years, and al-
though at first met with severe criticism, it now appears that the angry
comments have subsided. In practical fact, the Act has accomplished
much of what the legislature hoped it would. Much of the acrimony
that was present at the "guilt" phase of the trial under the prior law
has disappeared. Yet, under the new Act, bitterness and quarrels have
been carried into the custody and property division phases of the pro-
ceedings. Still, for all practical purposes, the judicial process of ob-
taining a dissolution is running uncontrovertibly.
The McKim decision emphasizing the courts' supervisory power has
served as the basis for two subsequent lower court opinions upholding
the constitutionality of the Act. However, in both Cosgrove and Walton,
there were reciprocal allegations of irreconcilable differences by hus-
band and wife. Were the supreme court to confront a true contested
dissolution, one in which the very existence of the ground was dis-
puted, a clear choice would be forced among several alternatives:
(1) To automatically grant a dissolution and exclude all other evi-
dence whenever one spouse refuses to reconcile, since such a refusal
277. See notes 181-86 supra and accompanying text.
278. "Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible."
CAL. Evm. CODE § 351 (West 1968). The Family Law Act was held not to work a
deprivation of due process of law in In re Marriage of Walton. See note 228 supra.
The Florida Supreme Court has ruled similarly in Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla.
1973), upholding that state's new divorce law. As does California's FLA, the Flor-
ida divorce statute establishes irretrievable marital breakdown and insanity or mental in-
competence as the sole grounds for divorce and applies retroactively to marriages entered
into before its effective date. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.001 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
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is proof of irreconcilability; (2) to require more proof of the actual
irreconcilable differences and more proof that the marriage has broken
down irremediably; or (3) to allow a party to introduce evidence other
than specific acts of misconduct to prove that the differences are not
irreconcilable. If the court followed (1), it would apply the same pro-
cedure that trial judges in Los Angeles County presently follow, reduc-
ing acrimony but effectively denying procedural due process to the re-
spondent in any contested dissolution. If the court chose to follow
(2), due process would be satisfied but the evidence admitted would
resemble that admissible under the prior "fault" system, a highly un-
desirable result in view of the calming intent of the FLA. Only (3)
would allow the unimpassioned proof of irreconcilable differences by
conclusionary testimony and permit adequate testing of the ground's ac-
tual existence without undue bitterness or a denial of due process.
Admittedly, under this alternative the mere allegation of irreconcilable
differences raises a rebuttable presumption of their existence, which
was probably not intended by the legislature. Yet, in this, and only
this, way, can the FLA constitutionally achieve its goal of virtually pain-
less no-fault dissolution. Perhaps one can have it both ways.
Elayne Carol Berg
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